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Institutional factors plays a important role in occupation mobil-
ity. One important question is whether there are institutional fac-
tors which hinders or facilitates mobility in occupation ladder. We
study whether judicial institutions affect occupation mobility in In-
dia. We assess the effect of formal judiciary on occupation mobility in
two ways. First, if it affects inter-generational mobility. Second, if a
better judical system help individuals to move away from their castes
traditional occupation. We find that an efficient formal judiciary leads
to higher intergenerational mobility. Moreover, the presence of strong
formal institutions also help individuals to move to a better occupation
from his/her castes traditional occupation. Our work also conrms that
socially disadvantaged sections, like SC-ST and women benefit more
from a more efficient formal judiciary. We present a simple theoretical
framework to understand the mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Occupational mobility plays an important role in solving the problem of
inequality. Occupational persistence across generations leads to an ineffi-
cient outcome as family tradition takes precedence over one’s inherent ability
while making the occupational choice. Such problems create an even bigger
problem in India where the caste system provides norms that support inter
generational persistence of occupation. However besides norms, inter gen-
erational occupational persistence works because it provides job training at
a low cost and helps in enforcing contracts through reputation mechanism
working through caste network. In the current paper, we examine whether
improvement in formal institutions of contract enforcement can substitute
informal network based institutions and thereby encourage people to switch
occupation.
The theoretical exposition of caste system as a general community based
contract enforcement system is already done by Freitas (2006). The impor-
tance of community enforcement in the context of medieval Europe is also
been emphasized by Greif (2004). In a country like India where formal en-
forcement is weak, access such community enforcement mechanism provides
incentive to stick to one’s family or community’s occupation. Besides con-
tract enforcement, trade communities also provide necessary training and
insurance in the face of bad shocks. The importance these issues are well
discussed in the context of craft guilds in medieval Europe (Epstein et al.,
1998). Therefore people have strong incentives to stick to their community
profession in absence of any market or state that provides insurance, edu-
cation and enforcement. The underlying theoretical premise of our paper
suggests that in a place with stronger formal enforcement people are more
likely to switch occupation than in a place with weaker enforcement.
Our work is in general related to the literature that deals with community
enforcement of contract (Dixit, 2004; Greif, 1993; Kandori, 1992). More
specifically this is related to a newly emerging area that that examines how
the traditional caste system gets affected by modern institutions of market.
A handful of papers identified the penetration of market by globalization and
economic reform in India and examined their interaction with the traditional
system. In one the pioneering paper in this field
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The idea of market weakening the traditional system was further examined,
albeit in a different set up, in Luke and Munshi (2011). In this paper they
showed that increase in relative income of female members leads to weakening
of family ties and women migration out of the community networks. The
interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions was also
examined by Chakraborty et al. (2015) who looked at the effect of improving
formal court on businesses which largely depend on informal network. They
found a negative interaction effect – strong formal court has a negative effect
on business from districts which are characterized by strong informal network.
In their theory, strengthening of formal court encourages entry by strangers in
business which in turn weakens the close knit community system that allowed
the poor entrepreneurs to enforce contracts at a low cost. Improvement in
formal court encourages the more wealthy outsiders to enter the business at
the cost of existing poor entrepreneurs who could not survive the increased
cost of contract enforcement. Hence, entrepreneurs from the lower tail would
leave the business. The net effect, they showed by empirical estimation, is
negative on the number of business in India.
While most of the studies looked at the cross section, Hnatkovska et al.
(2013) looked at the time series data. In their study they fond out that inter-
generational education and income mobility rates of SC/STs have converged
to non-SC/ST levels during post-liberalization period. Moreover, SC/STs
have been changing occupations relative to their parents at an increasing
rates which matches the corresponding switch rates of non-SC/STs. Our
paper is also related to papers which look the generic issue of mobility in
India and abroad. For example, Farooq and Kugler (2016) looks at the im-
pact of public health insurance upon occupation and industrial mobility, she
calculates the upward mobility as yearly transitions to a 3-level digit occu-
pation/industry that have higher median earnings and requiring the same or
higher educational credentials compared to their previous jobs. In a study
on India Nandi (2015) looked at the effect of human and physical capital on
industrial persistence relative to one’s parents. He found that people with
less education and asset are more likely to stay in the industry their fathers
worked in.
While most of the studies looked at how market opportunities weakened the
incentive of occupational persistence, there is not much on how improvement
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in formal institutions of contract enforcement – which is the onus of the
state – may incentivize more efficient allocation of human resources across
occupation. Our work attempts to fill in this gap in the literature.
In this study, we examine effect of formal institutions on mobility in oc-
cupation choice from the earlier generation or caste’s traditional occupation.
Key question that we answer in this research is whether presence of strong
formal networks helps individual to move up in occupation ladder or chose
that occupations which have higher educational requirements. We explore
the effect of formal networks on occupation mobility in two ways, one is
inter-generational mobility that is changing occupation in respect to father’s
occupation while second is moving away from caste’s traditional occupation.
We also compare the inter-generational occupation mobility for low caste and
high caste people in the presence of varying quality of formal institutions.
Occupation mobility is defined as change in occupation level based upon 2-
digit NCO code. In addition to this, we define upward mobility as moving
towards those occupations which requires higher educational skills compared
to previous occupation.
We find that given all other things constant, increase in formal networks
helps individuals in mobility towards better occupation from their father’s
occupation by 0.115 or 11.5% more and 0.311 or 31.1% more from caste’s tra-
ditional occupation because our theoretical premise is that improvements in
the formal institutions will remove the barrier created by informal networks
and enable free-flow of information between castes and create job opportuni-
ties for everyone which was not earlier possible because of traditional caste
networks. So in the presence of strong formal networks, a person will move
to a job which matches his skill sets irrespective of his caste. Also we have
found that SC/ST people benefit more from this formal networks settings
or they defect more as compared to General Category people in occupation
choices as compared to both father’s occupation and caste’s traditional oc-
cupation. As a result, children in SC/ST households continue to be more
likely to work in a different occupation than their parent relative to children
from non- SC/ST households.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
REDS data and the construction of the various variables used in our analysis.
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In Section 3, we describe our empirical model and estimation strategy. In
Section 4, we present the results of effects of formal networks on occupational
mobility. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this paper we model the Indian scenario which is charactarised by the
caste system. In the traditional caste system one’s occupation is fixed at
birth by the caste of his/her family that he/she is born into. Hence, we
can safely assume that there is a one to one correspondence between one’s
caste and the sector that his family’s traditional occupation. Besides caste
specific occupation, another important characteristic of the caste system is
the hierarchy – more skilled occupations are at the the top of the caste ladder.
We incorporate both these features in our model.
We denote sectors by x ∈ [0, 1] such that the higher sector is denoted
by higher price. This assumption characterizes the inherent hierarchy in
the caste system. We also assume that each sector x is populated by en-
trepreneurs and contractors of caste x. This assumption ensures that a spe-
cific caste goes into a specific sector/occupation.
The entrepreneurs and the contractors are living for two periods. The
production is carried out over two periods and each period there is a matching
between contractors and agent. However, we assume that the nature of
production is such that in period 1 entrepreneurs require a skilled job from
the contractors in which the contractors can cheat. But in period 2, the
contractor needs to carry out a mundane from which cheating is not possible.
The wage payable in period 2 (wn) < ws where ws is the wage in period 1.
In each caste there are entrepreneurs of measure 1 with ability θ ∈ [0, 1].
The ability for each caste is distributed as the distribution function Φ(.).
Each caste is also populated by infinite supply of contractors. The sequence
of the game is given below
1. An Entrepreneur is born in a specific caste xt which traditionally works
in the sector xt.
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2. They decide their sector of business – they can either stay in their
ancestral business sector xt or can start a new business in a new sector
xd
3. Entrepreneurs are matched with contractors for one period and they
decide whether to use formal or informal contract.
4. Contractor decide whether to cheat. Cheating is immediately punished
by fine or jail term if the contract is enforceable in the court of law.
In case of informal contracting he is punished by the members of the
caste.
5. In the next period, contractors are matched again with entrepreneurs.
If the contractor had cheated in the past and matched again with a
member of the same caste that he cheated before (and gone unpunished)
he is punished in this period with social sanction.
6. Pay-offs realized for both entrepreneurs and contractors.
2.1 Contractor’s decision making
Case I: Formal Contract
Contractor’s decision to cheat will depend on the type of contract. Under
formal contract the probability of conviction is p and the penalty upon con-
viction is κ while he gets B from cheating. Hence, cheating is not incentive
compatible if
B ≤ pκ (1)
This can be rewritten as p≥ B
κ
= p∗We throughout assume that p ≥ p∗
which means that formal institutions are effective in ensuring honesty from
contractors. However, there is a cost of formal contract writing which may
prevent entrepreneurs from writing formal contracts.
Case II: Informal Contract
Unlike formal contract, for informal contract, the cheater cannot be punished
immediately. A cheater contractor can only be punished if in the second
round of his work life he is matched with an entrepreneur of the same caste
as the first period. We assume that informal contracting is viable if the
contractor and the entrepreneur are of the same caste which in other words
mean if the entrepreneur stays back in his traditional occupation. This is
because when a cheating happens the entrepreneur claims that the contractor
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has cheated him while the contractor denies it. In presence of formal contract
the veracity of each party can be checked in light of the legal documents. In
the case of formal contracts such documents are not present – it is simply
one’s words against the other. Our assumption simply tells that if both
parties hail from the same caste, the caste members can verify their claims
based on insider’s information which are not admissible to the court of law.
For example, there can be a caste member who is trusted and respected
within the caste and his testimony can be considered as the proof of one’s
innocence or guilt as the case may be. Such testimony however does not get
any special treatment in formal court and therefore cannot be used as an
ultimate evidence.
The cost of punishment is τ . Suppose he is matched with an entrepreneur
of caste x in period 1. The contractor will not cheat the entrepreneur if his
payoff is higher than the honesty pay off which is ws + wn. Condition for
honesty is
B + µx(−τ) + (1− µx)(wn) ≤ ws + wn (2)






Entrepreneurs decide the destination occupation which in equilibrium could
be equal to their original occupation as well. In any sector the price the
entrepreneur gets depends on two things – entrepreneur’s ability(θ) and the
sector itself(x). The price rise with the rise in both (θ) and (x). In an
occupation x, an entrepreneur with ability θ gets the price p(theta, x) = θPx.
Let us analyze migration decision of a representative entrepreneur whose
traditional occupation xt. He chooses his destination occupation xd such that
his gain from migration is maximized. However, there is a cost of migration
– in case of migration the entrepreneur needs to sign a formal contract which
is costly.
We assume that the cost of signing the contract is rising in the distance
between the entrepreneur’s traditional occupation and the destination occu-
pation. We justify this assumption by the argument that contract framing
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requires domain knowledge and farther the destination is from one’s tradi-
tional business, the more costly it will be for him to acquire the knowledge
and that will increase the cost. We assume that the cost function takes the
form c | xd − xt |.
V = θPxd − c | xd − xt | (4)
Moreover, the maximization is subject to the constraint that the entrepreneur
earns at least as much profit at his destination business as in his original
business
θPx∗d − c | x
∗
d − xt |≥ θPxt(5)
The objective function can be written as
V = θPxd − c(xd − xt) (6)
if xd > xt, and
V = θPxd − c(xt − xd) (7)
if xd ≤ xt
Let us solve the optimization problem for these two ranges separately. Let










2 − c = 0 (9)














2 + c > 0 (11)
This implies that for any xd, we will have corner solution xd = xt. Next we
check whether the solution satisfies equation(5). For the range, xd > xt, the






































This shows that for the range, xd > xt, the optimal migration destina-





. However, for range, xd ≤ xt
entrepreneurs do not migrate. The rules of migration are given below:
For any business xt,
1. Entrepreneurs with ability θ ≤ 2c
√
xt will stay back in their tradition
business i.e. xt.
2. For each business of origin xt, entrepreneurs with ability θ > 2c
√
xt





Let us now examine the differential impact of improvements in formal institu-
tions on migration for different caste members. In this model we identify the
improvements in formal institutions as reduction in the cost of writing formal
contracts. For any caste x, the population of entrepreneurs who migrate is
given by
mx = 1− Φ(2c
√
x) (14)
where Φ(.) represents the distribution of entrepreneurial ability within a
caste. Now the impact of institutional improvement on a representative caste






2 Φ′ < 0 (15)
This leads to our first proposition
Proposition 2.1 Improvement in formal institutions lead to higher occupa-
tional mobility Next we check, given the quality of formal institutions, which






2 Φ′ < 0 (16)
This leads to our next proposition
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Proposition 2.2 Given the quality of formal institutions, lower caste en-
trepreneurs migrate more than their higher caste counterpart.
The intuition of this result is straight forward. Given that the marginal
cost of migration is same for everybody and given that the price function
increases with the rise in the rank of an occupation in decreasing rate, lower
caste members stands to gain more on the margin. This leads to higher
migration for the entrepreneurs from lower castes than their higher caste
counterpart.
Next we check how the marginal effect of institutional improvement on





2 Φ′ + 2cΦ′′] (17)
The sign of the equation 17 is ambiguous and depends on the assumptions
we can make on the ability distribution. For example, if assume Uniform
distribution for the ability distribution of entrepreneurs, Φ′′ = 0 and ∂mc
∂x
< 0.
From this we get our next proposition,
Proposition 2.3 If ability of entrepreneurs within a caste follows Uniform
distribution, improvements in institutions encourages low caste entrepreneurs
more to migrate than their high caste counterpart.
Let us now look at the caste composition of each sector which in turn de-
termination of informal mechanism across sectors. We know that the higher
is the proportion of outsiders in a sector, the less effective will be the infor-
mal mechanism. Specifically, we want to check whether the proportion of
outsiders systematically changes as we move up the caste/sector hierarchy.
The answer is not straightforward. Because as we move up the ladder on
one hand higher proportion of the original caste members stay back but on
the other hand higher entrepreneurial payoff in those sectors attract more
migrant. In the next paragraph we systematically calculate the proportion
of migrants in any sector x̂.
We know that for any sector x̂, entrepreneurs with ability θ ≤ 2c
√
x̂ will
stay back in their original business. But this is not the complete pool of
entrepreneurs for the business x̂ as entrepreneurs will migrate from all busi-
nesss x < x̂. However, for any such x, among the migrants there is a one
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to one correspondence between the ability of the entrepreneurs and destina-
tion business – the mapping is given by equation (10). From all the x < x̂,
only entrepreneurs with ability 2c
√
x̂ will migrate to destination business
x̂. Hence, after the migration stage, any business x̂ will have two types of
entrepreneurs – traditional and migrants. The population of original en-
trepreneurs in business x̂ is given by





On the other hand, migrant entrepreneurs are entrepreneurs with ability
2c
√
x̂ migrating from all business x < x̂. Hence, the population of migrant




dx = x̂ (19)


















As we can check ∂µ̃x
∂x
< 0. We have already shown that informal mechanism
only works if µx < µ
∗. Hence, informal mechanism will cease to be functional











From the above equation we get the following cut off value of x
x∗ = 4c2
(




From this we get our next proposition,
Proposition 2.4 Informal contract enforcement mechanism cease to exist
for sufficiently high skilled/ high productive sector. However, this cutoff level
is declining in the cost of social sanction.
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The intuition for this proposition is also straight forward. Informal mech-
anism is weakened by migration. Incentive is high to migrate to a high skilled
sector (which is characterized by the high price of the product the sector pro-
duces). However, for such sector probability to stay back for the traditional
caste members is also high which strengthens the informal sector. In the
exercise above we find a cut off point, beyond which the incentive to migrate
dominates. However, we also find that such cut-off point goes up with high
cost of informal punishment. This result is generally consistent with two
casual observations. First is that blue collar jobs are more dominated by
networks while white collar jobs cater to more diverse work population. In
the macro level, we also find that informal mechanism works better in less
developed countries while for developed countries such as the US are char-
acterized by more ethnic diversity and better formal institutions. Second is
that in a few high paying sector we see that the business is largely concen-
trated in the hand of a few families where the cost of defection for a family
member is quite high.
3 Empirical Methodology
The underlying theoretical framework in the previous section yields two im-
portant hypotheses. First, the presence of a formal network helps in occu-
pational mobility. Second such marginal effect will vary by the caste. To be
more specific, this means that a better formal network will matter more for
occupational mobility of SC/ST people in relation to the general category
individuals.
Empirically, therefore we want to test that whether the presence of a
strong formal network helps an individual to move away from occupations of
earlier generations or the traditional occupation of his/her caste . The main
specification to address this question is given by the following equation:
Mobilityihvd = β0 + β1Formalvd + β3Xi + β4Xh + β5Xv +Dd + εihvd (24)
Here, Mobilityihvd is the variable capturing whether an individual i in
household h in village v in district d is moving away from the earlier or
more traditional occupation. Formalv is the variable capturing the presence
of a formal network in the village v and X corresponds to all individual,
household as well as village level variables.The interest lies in estimating
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the parameter β1 which would give us the relationship between the presence
of formal network in the village and the mobility chances of an individual
residing in that village.
One empirical challenge comes in terms of identification. It is possible
that in districts which are more traditional, more individuals tend to rely on
informal networks to sort out any problems and at the same time, individuals
residing in those conservative districts may be more reluctant to move away
from the more traditional occupations. To address such concerns, we in-
clude district fixed effects Dd in the model. Basically we are then comparing
villages within a district.
4 Data
Data for our study comes from Rural Economic Demographic Survey (REDS)
data from 1999 and 2006 rounds. REDS data set is a nationally represen-
tative survey of 8659 households residing in 242 vilages in 17 states across
India.
The dependent variable is the mobility status of an individual residing
in a household in one particular village. We have captured occupational
mobility in two different manners - one is by looking at inter-generational
occupational mobility and the other is by examining the shifting of occupa-
tion away from the traditional occupation of the caste of the individual. In
order to capture inter-generational occupational mobility, we use a dummy
variable which takes value 1 if the occupation of an individual is different
from his/her father’s occupation and 0 otherwise. Similarly, for the study
about occupation mobility from caste’s traditional occupation, the outcome
variable is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if individual’s occupation
is different from his/her caste’s traditional occupation and 0 otherwise. To
identify the caste’s traditional occupation, we make use of one particular
question in REDS which specifically asks for the traditional occupation of
each caste in each village.
The variable of interest is the prevalence of formal institutions in the vil-
lage.To define this measure, we use one survey question in REDS data which
asks individuals about whom they approach to solve problems related to pub-
lic good. Out of the options given in this survey to answer this question,we
only consider the formal sources to construct this measure. We converted
the responses to a continuous variable by aggregating those to the village
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level. This village level measure represents the fraction of people in a vil-
lage who approached formal network sources to solve their problems. This
thus captures the degree of reliance of the people in a village on the formal
institutions.
We also control for a rich set of individual, household and village level
variables. Individual variables include age, education and migration status.
We divide age into four age groups of age 16 - 25, 26-40, 41 -60 and 61-70.
The youngest group is taken as the reference category for this categorical
variable. Education is measured by years of completed education in some
specifications while in some other specifications, it is taken as a categorical
variable. Primary and secondary education are clubbed together under the
category ”Secondary & Below ”, higher secondary and some college level is
re-coded as ” College Dropouts” while graduation and post-graduation comes
under the category ”Bachelors & Above” .Illiterate education level remains
the reference category. The migration status variable is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if a person has migrated in the village in last 5
years for employment reasons and 0 otherwise.
At the household level, we control for the caste of the household. This
is again a categorical variable with three categories - SC, ST, OBC with the
fourth category General as the reference category. A host of village-level
variables including village population, total travel time to nearest district
headquarter, total number of households affected by natural shocks in the
village and total number of industrial establishments in the village have been
added as controls.All these variables affect the individual’s decision regarding
change of occupation and hence are essential to control for.
Our sample has been restricted to males with age ranging from 16 to 70
for whom we have occupation level information 1.The sample reduced to 9152
individuals for the analysis of inter-generational mobility and 4162 observa-
tions for the analysis on shifting of occupations away from the traditional
occupation of the caste.
A descriptive statistics of important variables for inter-generational oc-
cupation mobility study is shown in table 1.
1REDS data set contains information about the three-digit occupation code (based
on the 1968 National Classification of Occupation (NCO)) associated with the work that
each individual performed. For this study, we convert three digit Occupation code into
two digit occupation level.
13
Table 1: Descriptive Summary of the Variables for Intergenerational Occu-
pation Mobility Study
Panel A: Outcome Variable
Mean sd
Occupation Differs from Father’s Occupation Yes 2888 33.25
No 5798 66.75
Panel B
Variable of Interest Mean sd
Formal Measure 0.419 0.219
Panel C: Control Variables Mean sd
i.Individual Level Variables
Age (Father) 50.26 12.73
Age (Child) 27.47 8.01
Age-Group 16 to 25 years 1464 16.77
26 to 40 years 2950 33.78
41 to 60 years 3349 38.35
61 to 70 years 969 11.10
Average Education Years (Father) 5.39 4.92
Average Education Years (Child) 8.34 4.49











Industrial Establishments near the village 59.13 76.35
Households affected by Shocks 526.81 483.15
Travel time to the nearest district
To begin with, 33.25% of people have changed their occupation from that
of their father. On average 49% of individuals in a village believe in formal
networks. Average age of an individual belonging to the second generation
referred to as child is 27.47 years while the average age of an individual from
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the first generation referred to as father is 50.26 years. In the first generation,
average years of completed education is 5.39 while it is 8.34 years for second
generation. Also, 13.86% of households are SC, 6.63% are ST and 31.56%
households belong to General category. On average, there are around 59.13
industry establishments in the village in past 3 years while average popula-
tion of village in logarithmic terms is 7.63.
Table 2 shows the descriptive summary of the variables for the analysis
on occupation mobility from caste traditional occupation.
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Table 2: Descriptive Summary of the Variables for Caste Occupation Mobil-
ity Study
Panel A: Outcome Variable
Mean sd
Occupation Differs from Caste Occupation Yes 2271 54.64
No 1888 45.36
Panel B
Variable of Interest Mean sd
Formal - Measure 0.495 0.223




Education Illiterate 1068 26.00
Secondary & Below 1984 48.30
College Dropout 725 17.64
Bachelors & Above 331 8.06
Age-Group 16 to 25 years 775 18.62
26 to 40 years 1515 36.40
41 to 60 years 1522 36.57
61 to 70 years 350 8.41
Average Education Years (Father) 5.39 4.92
Average Education Years (Child) 8.34 4.49











Industrial Establishments near the village 52.201 67.18
Households affected by Shocks 514.14 445.92
Travel Time to Nearest District HQ 114.45 67.54
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First, for this sample, we can see that there are 54.64% people who
changed their occupation as compared to their caste’s traditional occupa-
tion. In this sample, on average,in a village, 49.5% of people believe in formal
institutions. Average age of people is 39.70 years. If we look at education
level of people in this sample, we find that there are 26% are illiterate peo-
ple while 48.30% people are have education below secondary level and only
8.06% people has bachelors and above education. Also,7.83% households are
SC, 6.01% are ST and 30.56% households belong to general category. Finally
on average, there are around 52.01 industry establishments in the village in
past 3 years while average population of village in logarithmic terms is 7.50.
5 Results
5.1 Inter-generational Mobility in Occupation Choice
The results of the main estimating equation for inter-generational occupa-
tional mobility are presented in Table 3. Column 1 shows the bi-variate
relationship without controlling for covariates. The coefficient indicates that
with an increase in reliance on formal institutions, more individuals are likely
to shift their occupations away from their father’s. occupations.However as
mentioned before, unobserved regional factors may be correlated with both
the formal institutional quality and the mobility status of an individual.It
may be possible that less people rely on formal networks to sort out their
problems in districts with more traditional values and at the same time, on
average less number of individuals would like to shift their occupations in
those very districts. Hence to counter this, we add district fixed effects.
We can then identify the marginal effect by comparing villages within a dis-
trict.All the other columns in Table 3 therefore include the district fixed
effects. The coefficient becomes insignificant in column 2. Column 3 reports
the results after controls for individual characteristics namely age and years
of education have been included. In column 4 we include the caste informa-
tion at the household level. Finally column 5 which is the full specification
model includes a host of village level variables in addition to individual and
household level variables. All these variables affect the decision of an indi-
vidual to change his/her occupation.
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The significant positive relationship between the measure of prevalence
of formal institutions and chances of occupational mobility is robust to the
inclusion of all these variables. The coefficient in the full specification model
indicates that if the proportion of people relying on formal institutions in-
creases by one unit, there would be 11.5% higher inter-generational occu-
pational mobility.This result supports our hypothesis that an increase in
strength of formal networks will facilitate switching of occupations for the
current generation as opposed to the earlier generation.
The coefficients on the control variables suggest expected results.Negative
coefficients on age groups imply that younger individuals shift their occupa-
tions more in comparison to the older people. However the coefficient is
significant only for the 61-70 age group. The reference category being the
youngest group, this means specifically that individuals in the age group 16-
25 years will be more likely to change than people falling in older age group.
The younger group has a longer time horizon to reap the benefits of any
change and hence evidently will be more likely to change. People with a bet-
ter education are more likely to shift their occupations as probably they will
have more exposure and hence will be more aware of greater opportunities.
For the caste variables, the coefficients are significant and positive for
both SC/ST and OBCs. Hence in comparison to individuals from general
category,our results suggest that individuals from backward classes are more
likely to change their occupations.
The coefficients on village level variables also show intuitive results. Travel
time serving as the proxy for the quality of transport in a village has a nega-
tive and significant coefficient.An inconvenient transport system resulting in
higher travel time may act as a hindrance to the efforts of an individual to
change occupations. The positive coefficient on industrial establishment in-
dicates that a higher presence of industrial establishments facilitate a higher
switching of occupations maybe due to greater available opportunities. Pop-
ulation shows a negative coefficient as with more people around, it may be
difficult to get new openings and hence lesser are chances of shifting.
5.2 Mobility in Occupation Choices from Caste’s Tra-
ditional Occupation
Traditionally, individuals rely on own caste network to start a new enterprise.
A network can not only provide important information needed to start a new
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Table 3: Intergenerational Occupation Mobility : Formal Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Formal 0.109*** 0.106 0.108*** 0.078* 0.115**





age (26 to 40) 0.005 0.008 -0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
age (41 to 60) -0.026 -0.020 -0.022
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
age (61 to 70) -0.096*** -0.086*** -0.089***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
Years of schooling 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)










Constant 0.675*** 0.575*** 0.709*** 1.193*** 0.251*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.038) (0.106) (0.012)
Observations 9,094 9,081 9,081 6,226 6,226
R-squared 0.020 0.035 0.041 0.042 0.026
district FE NO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Districts 94 94 94 77
Source: REDS data set, Author’s Own Calculation
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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enterprise but also provide loan and ensure enforceability of contracts that are
required for a business. If an individual defects from the traditional occupa-
tion then he/she cannot depend on his informal caste network for any future
help in terms of loans or contractors to work with. Hence, most individuals
tend to stick to the industry that is in the traditional occupational category
of his/her caste.Hence, next, we try to find out whether formal institutions
help individuals to move away from caste’s traditional occupation.
Results are presented in table 4.Columns are organized in a similar man-
ner to that of table 3. Results indicate a positive relationship between the
measure of formal institutions and the chances of shifting the occupation.
The coefficients become significant only after adding household and village
level variables. The coefficient on the formal measure for the full specifica-
tion model in column 5 indicates that for an additional unit increase in the
proportion of individuals going to formal sources for problem solving,32.1
percent of individuals change occupation away from the caste’s traditional
occupation.The coefficients on control variables show more or less the same
results as obtained in the earlier model of inter-generational occupational
mobility.
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5.3 Upward or Downward Occupation Mobility from
Caste Traditional Occupation
In the previous section, we have established one important result that formal
networks increase the probability of switching occupation from caste’s tradi-
tional occupation Next, we examine that whether these occupation switches
involve an improvement or deterioration in occupations. In other words we
try to find out that whether formal networks helps in upward occupational
mobility.
Upward occupational mobility is mobility is defined as moving towards
the occupation level which requires higher educational skills as compared to
previous occupation while downward mobility is defined as moving towards
the occupation level which requires lesser educational skills as compared to
previous occupation2. To estimate the above relationship we use the same
specification as in the earlier analyses. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable which takes value 1 if individual has changed occupation compared
to caste’s traditional occupation and moved towards the occupation which
requires higher education skills and it takes values 0 otherwise. As we have
already discussed earlier occupation ranking is calculated by average level of
education years required to perform that job.Table 5 shows the results for
upward mobility.
2Generally, ranking of occupation level is determined by wages but we don’t have wage
information of the occupation level hence we use other important parameter education
level to rank the occupation.
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Table 4: Occupation Mobility from Traditional Caste Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Formal 0.182 0.195 0.223 0.311* 0.321**





age (26 to 40) -0.015 -0.008 -0.017
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
age (41 to 60) -0.046** -0.039* -0.038*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
age (61 to 70) -0.119*** -0.108*** -0.110***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Years of schooling 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)










Constant 0.452*** 0.450*** 0.501*** 0.497*** 0.634***
(0.051) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.253)
Observations 4,162 4,162 4,155 4,155 3,162
R-squared 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.038 0.072
district FE NO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Districts 94 94 94 75
Source: REDS data set, Author’s Own Calculation
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Upward Occupation Mobility from Traditional Caste Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Formal -0.224*** 0.045 0.069 0.163** 0.155*





Age (26 to 40) 0.052** 0.045* 0.044*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age ( 41 to 60) 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.069***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Age ( 61 to 70) -0.072** -0.114*** -0.112***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Secondary & Below 0.081*** 0.082***
(0.022) (0.022)
College Dropouts 0.198*** 0.201***
(0.027) (0.027)




Constant 0.570*** 0.432*** 0.201*** 0.064 0.121
(0.026) (0.052) (0.053) (0.063) (0.076)
Observations 2,269 2,269 2,269 2,239 2,179
R-squared 0.010 0.000 0.105 0.114 0.104
district FE NO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Districts 94 94 94 91
Source: REDS data set, Author’s Own Calculation
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results show a positive and statistically significant coefficient on formal
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measure which confirms our hypothesis that a higher prevalence of strong
formal networks leads to mobility towards better occupation. An additional
increase in formal networks leads to a 0.155 or 15.5% increase in probabil-
ity of switching occupation towards better jobs. This positive results shows
that formal networks creates supportive environment for upward occupation
mobility which can translate in growth of economy. Other coefficients on
control variables also have consistent sign as expected from theory.
5.4 Heterogeneity Analysis
In order to identify the pathway through which this positive relationship
works, we ran a heterogeneity analysis by running the regressions separately
for different castes. As expected, people from backward castes may not get
the requisite information from the informal networks to change their occu-
pations and start a new career. For example, an individual belonging to a
backward caste which traditionally worked in the leather industry is unlikely
to get any help from his/her own caste network to start a business in the tex-
tile industry. If the individual defects from the traditional occupation then
he/she cannot depend on his informal caste network for any future help in
terms of loans or contractors to work with. This is more of a problem for the
backward castes as the other informal networks dominated by higher castes
will be totally inaccesible to them. However, if the formal judicial system is
strong, formal financial institutions would be more willing to give business
loans to these marginalised castes and hence facilitate the occupational mo-
bility of these castes more in relation to general category individuals. Results
are shown in table 6. As expected, SC/ST people are changing occupations
more as compared to Non SC/ST people in the presence of formal networks.
Though both the coefficients are statistically significant, the coefficient of
formal for SC/ST is 0.59 while for Non SC/ST it is 0.490 .
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Age (26 to 40) -0.061* 0.008
(0.032) (0.021)
Age (41 to 60) -0.092*** -0.025
(0.033) (0.021)
Age ( 61 to 70) -0.104* -0.101***
(0.053) (0.030)
Secondary & Below 0.023 -0.051**
(0.032) (0.019)
College Dropouts -0.089** -0.051**
(0.044) (0.024)








Travel Time 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0020) (0.0004)






Number of districtid 30 67
District FE Yes Yes
Source: REDS data set, Author’s Own Calculation
Standard errors in parentheses , *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the effect of formal institutions upon occupa-
tion mobility using Rural Economic Demographic Survey (REDS) data set
from 1999 and 2006 rounds. This is particularly important in the context
of developing countries where occupation choices are generally based upon
information provided by community or caste networks. We define occupation
mobility in two ways, first is inter-generational occupation mobility which is
change in occupation compared to earlier generation while second is switch-
ing occupation relative to caste’s traditional occupation. We further define
upward and occupation mobility to assess the improvement or deterioration
in change in occupation level.
We find that formal institutions affect the occupation mobility positively
for both cases . Specifically, for 1 unit increase in formal measure, there
would be 11.5% higher inter-generational occupation mobility. Similarly, for
an additional unit increase in formal networks will increase the probability of
changing occupation from the caste’s traditional occupation by 32.1%. Fur-
ther, we have found out that prevalence of strong formal leads to switching
occupation towards better occupation choices. Main result of paper is formal
networks affects the mobility in occupation choices positively. In addition to
this, we further found that in presence of formal networks, SC/ST who are
considered as marginalized or low-level castes changes occupation more com-
pared to General category people.
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